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Extended predictive minds: do Markov Blankets matter?
Abstract:
The  extended  mind  thesis  claims  that  a  subject’s  mind  sometimes  encompasses  the
environmental props the subject interacts with while solving cognitive tasks. Recently,  the
debate  over  the  extended  mind  has  been  focused  on  Markov  Blankets:  the  statistical
boundaries separating biological systems from the environment. Here, I argue such a focus is
mistaken, because Markov Blankets neither adjudicate, nor help us adjudicate, whether the
extended mind thesis  is  true.  To do so, I briefly introduce Markov Blankets and the free
energy principle in section 2. I then turn from exposition to criticism. In section 3, I argue that
using  Markov  Blankets  to  determine  whether  the  mind  extends  either  begs  the  question
against the extended mind or provides us an answer based on circular reasoning. In section 4,
I  consider  whether  Markov  Blankets  help  us  perspicuously  frame  the  debate  over  the
extended mind, answering in the negative. This is because resorting to Markov Blankets to
determine  whether  the  mind  extends  yields  extensionally  inadequate  conclusions  which
violate the parity principle. In section 5, I argue that resorting to Markov Blankets makes
internalism  about  the  mind  vacuously  true,  preventing  any  substantial  inquiry  over  the
extended mind. A brief concluding paragraph follows.
Keywords: Extended Mind, Free-energy Principle, Markov Blankets, Active Inference
1 - Introduction
Vehicle  externalism (also  known as  the  extended  mind  thesis)  claims  that  a  subject’s
“thinking machinery”1 sometimes includes the environmental props the subject interacts with
while solving cognitive tasks (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Hurley 2010). Importantly, vehicle
externalism makes no claim concerning the nature of the thinking machinery;  it  is only a
claim concerning its physical constituents (vehicles). Vehicle externalism is thus compatible
with different  accounts  of mentality,  including computationalism (Clark 2008),  ecological
psychology (Chemero 2009), enactivism (Di Paolo 2009), dynamicism (Palermos 2014) and
more. As a consequence, how vehicle externalism should be articulated and whether or not it
is true are intensely debated topics (Kiverstein 2018; Rowlands et al. 2020).
1 Here, I use the phrase “vehicle externalism” to stay neutral on the distinction between extended  cognition,
extended mind and extended consciousness. This is because I’m interested in vehicle externalism per se, rather
than any particular form it might assume - so, I needed a “catch all” term. Similarly, I use “thinking machinery”
as a catch the system that is supposed to extend, be it a cognitive, conscious or mental system.
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The recent popularity of “predictive” approaches to the mind, especially Friston’s free-
energy  principle  (FEP  e.g.  Friston  2010),  generated  a  wave  of  “predictive”  vehicle
externalism (e.g.  Clark 2017a)  counterbalanced by equally consistent  wave of internalism
(e.g. Hohwy 2016). Their clash rapidly centered around Markov Blankets (MBs), focusing on
questions  like:  “is  there  a  privileged  MB  surrounding  the  thinking  machinery?”  (e.g.
Ramstead et al. 2019); and: “if yes, does it enshroud only the brain?” (e.g. Hohwy 2016).
Here, I wish to take a step back from these questions, to observe the role MBs play in the
debate over “predictive” vehicle  externalism.  To anticipate,  I will  argue that MBs neither
adjudicate, nor  help  to adjudicate, that debate. My plan is as follows. In the next section, I
introduce the FEP, focusing on MBs. In section 3, I argue that, on their own, MBs do not
provide a solution to the debate over vehicle externalism. In section 4, I argue that MBs do
not even provide a good way to frame that debate, showing that the framing offered by MBs
has  thus  far  forced  us  to  adopt  an  extensionally  inadequate  criterion  to  identify  the
constituents of our thinking machinery. In section 5, I argue that resorting to MBs leads us to
sidestep, in an important sense, the debate over vehicle externalism, as they make vehicle
internalism vacuously true2. A brief concluding paragraph follows.
2 - Free-energy: a selective sample
The FEP is standardly presented as an account of biological self-organization, stating that
the persistence of biological systems is guided by  free-energy minimization (Friston 2011;
2012; 2013; Friston and Stephan 2007; Hesp et al. 2019).3
2 A “disclosure statement”: I endorse vehicle externalism. But my aim here is not to defend it. My only aim is to
argue that the debate over vehicle externalism should leave MBs behind. So the problem I raise in section 5 is
not that MBs make vehicle internalism true, but that they do so vacuously.
3 Readers familiar with the FEP might object that the FEP is “scale free”, as it provides an account of existence
in general (e.g. Hipolito 2019; Friston 2019). It is hard, however, not to notice that the FEP is typically offered
as a principled solution to the problem of biological self-organization (e.g. Friston 2013; Hohwy 2020; Corcoran
et al. 2020; Seth 2020). At this juncture, then, it might be useful to state that the FEP is, theoretically speaking, a
moving target, whose formal apparatus is still under construction (consider, for instance, the recent introduction
of dual information geometries, see Parr  et al. 2020) and whose epistemic status and ontological commitment
are far from clear (see Colombo and Wright 2018; van Es 2020). 
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Consider the variables implicated in the prolonged existence of an organism (e.g. level of
glucose in the blood, level of activation of photoreceptors,  etc.).  Their  values collectively
determine  the organism's  state,  and their  range determines  the set  of  possible  organismal
states, which can be represented as a state-space having one dimension for every variable.
Points in such a space represent particular states (e.g. glucose at level x, photoreceptors active
at level y, etc.). In principle, an organism might occupy any point of that space - but typically
won’t. My bodily temperature, for instance, is typically around 36.6°; hence I tend to “occupy
points” clustered around that value. The same holds true for other dimensions of that space.
Therefore, organisms occupy only a small volume of that huge state-space; and they must do
so if they want to continue living (Friston 2019: 175-178). If I start wandering towards the
“54° bodily temperature” region of my state-space, I would be toasted (literally).
According to the FEP, that small volume in the state space formally captures an organism’s
phenotype.4 To continue  living,  organisms must  constantly occupy points in  that  volume;
therefore they must constantly re-visit the states belonging to their phenotype. For this reason,
the FEP assumes that organisms are  ergodic; meaning that: “one can interpret the average
amount of time a state is occupied as the probability of the system being in that state when
observed at random” (Friston 2013: 2). An example might help clarify this concept. Suppose
a fair dice is cast eternally. Being fair, the dice will occupy a state (i.e. displaying number n)
 of the time. Moreover, since the dice is fair, were I to observe it randomly, I would observe⅙
it displaying n with a probability of roughly 0.17; that is, p(n) =  ≈ 0.17. Hence,⅙  the time the
dice spends in a state (displaying  n) approximates the probability that I would observe that
state if I observed the dice at random.
4 Technically speaking, the FEP conceives phenotypes as sets of attractors constraining the organism’s path
through  its  state-space  (e.g.  Friston  2013),  which  are  determined  by  each  organism’s  embodiment  and
evolutionary history (e.g. Friston et al. 2012). In the most recent renditions of the FEP, they are also referred to
as the non-equilibrium steady state density (Friston et al 2020).
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A  probability  function  can  thus  be  defined  over  the  states  in  the  state-space.  States
belonging to the phenotype will be highly probable, whereas non-phenotypic states will be
highly unlikely. The distribution will thus be sharply peaked around phenotypic states (e.g.
“bodily temperature 36.6°”) and very flat on all other states (e.g. “bodily temperature 54°”);
technically speaking, that distribution has low entropy.5 This also means that, on average and
in the long run, organisms occupy states with low surprisal (given their phenotypes). Here,
surprisal  is  an  information  theoretic  quantity  (basically,  the  negative  logarithm  of  a
probability) quantifying how “far off” any given state is from the phenotypic states; that is,
the states the organism should occupy to prolong its existence. Thus, to survive, organism
must  keep the entropy over their  states low, or, which is  equivalent,  avoid “surprisaling”
states on average and in the long run. Notice that such a “long run” perspective is essential to
the FEP. In fact, it is only because this “long run” perspective is adopted that the ergodicity
assumption holds, thereby allowing biological self-organization to be described as surprisal
avoidance overtime.
Importantly, organisms cannot quantify surprisal directly. According to the FEP, however,
they  can  keep  track  of  an  upper  bound on  surprisal,  which  is  (variational)  free-energy
(Buckley  et  al.  2017).  Organisms  can  track  free  energy  because  it  is  a  function  of  two
probability densities organisms can track; namely a  generative density, which specifies the
joint  probability  of  worldly  and  sensory  states  given  a  model  of  how sensory  states  are
produced; and a recognition  (or variational) density encoding the system’s “beliefs”6 about
worldly states. The recognition density is said to be encoded by the system’s internal states;
whereas the generative density is said to be “entailed” by the system’s dynamics, meaning
5 Notice that here entropy is an information-theoretic quantity, not physical entropy. See (Linson et al. 2018) for
their relation.
6 In the FEP literature, beliefs are estimated probabilities of external states of affairs, rather than propositional
attitudes with linguistic content.
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that  the  system’s  dynamics  realize  the  inversion  of  a  generative  model  (i.e.  maps  the
organism’s sensory states on their most likely causes; see Ramstead et al. 2020a: 7-8).7
Free-energy is an upper bound of surprisal because it can be mathematically decomposed
into  the  sum  of  surprisal  and  a  the  Kullback-Leibler  divergence between  the  system’s
variational density and the true probability distribution over worldly states. Bluntly put, the
Kullback-Leibler divergence can be thought of as a measure of how much the organisms’
guesses about worldly states are wrong. The lower the divergence,  the better  the guesses.
Since the Kullback-Leibler divergence is always positive, free-energy will always be greater
than surprisal. Hence minimizing it will implicitly minimize surprisal, keeping the organism
alive.
There are two ways to minimize free-energy. A system can minimize free energy just by
minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence.  This is  perceptual  inference,  which does  not
minimize surprisal. It only minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence. However, perceptual
inference is necessary to ensure that free-energy is a tight bound on surprisal. For, only when
free-energy is  a  tight  bound on surprisal  active  inference (i.e.  a  self-generated  change of
sensory states) can minimize surprisal effectively (Bruineberg et al. 2018a).
Perceptual and active inference can be taken as corresponding to a form of perception and
action8 (Corcoran  et  al.  2020).  Importantly,  in  more  complex  systems9 free-energy
minimization  affords  an  optimal  way  to  balance  explorative  (or  epistemic)  actions  and
exploitative (or pragmatic) actions (Friston  et al. 2016), while making the agent learn the
most efficient and minimalistic routes to success (Tschantz et al. 2020). In this way, the FEP
7 In  recent times, these points have been spelled out using complex mathematical  constructs (namely,  non-
equilibrium steady states and dual information geometries) that are not immediately relevant to the purposes of
this essay (see Parr et al. 2020; Friston et al. 2020).
8 Saying that active inference corresponds to action (i.e. bodily movements fulfilling an intention) is imprecise.
In fact, each and every self-generated change of sensory state (e.g. sweating to lower one’s bodily temperature)
is an instance of active inference (see Seth and Friston 2016). Here I’m momentarily sacrificing precision to ease
of exposition. 
9 Namely, systems able to quantify their expected free-energy; that is, the-free energy expected under various
courses of action, see (Friston et al. 2013) and (Millidege et al. 2020) for discussion.
PRE PEER REVIEW VERSION       6/29
makes contact with one of the core insights of vehicle externalism; namely the claim that
often fast  and fluid  environmental  interactions  are  the grounds upon which our cognitive
successes rest (Clark 2017b).
Crucially,  perceptual  and  active  inference  are  enabled by  Markov  Blankets.  Strictly
speaking, a MB is a formal property of nodes (i.e. a variable) in graphical models. Graphical
models  are  sets  of  nodes  (representing  variables)  and  directed  edges  connecting  nodes
(representing  causal  or  probabilistic  relation  among  variables)  used  to  simplify  the
computation of complex probability densities (see Koski and Noble 2009 for an introduction).
MBs are one tool servicing this simplificatory purpose. Within a graph, a MB is the minimal
set  of  nodes  that  allows  us  to  accurately estimate  the state  of  the variable  of  interest.  It
typically includes the  parents of  the target  node (i.e.  the nodes  directly  leading to it),  its
children (i.e. the nodes to which the target node directly leads) and its eventual co-parents (i.e.
the  nodes  directly  connected  to  the  target  node’s  children)  (Koski  and  Noble  2009:  50).
Technically  speaking,  the  nodes  constituting  a  MB  make  the  target  (Blanketed)  node
conditionally independent from all other nodes in the graph; roughly put, the Blanket shields
off their influence on the target node. In this way, they allow one to estimate  optimally the
state of a target node by considering only a few (typically a small fraction) of the nodes in a
graph, simplifying the computation.
According  to  the  FEP,  MB  are  also  ontologically  real,  functional  boundaries  which
separate  biological  systems  from the  environment  in  a  non  arbitrary  way (Friston  2013;
Kirchhoff et al. 2018).10 A typical example is that of a cell’s membrane. The cell’s membrane
is  a  functionally  relevant  boundary  which  allows  the  cell  to  differentiate  itself  from its
10 Notice, importantly, that such a reading of MBs as ontologically real functional boundaries does not follow
directly from (and it is not justified by) the relevant literature on graphical models (see Menary and Gillett 2020;
Bruineberg et al. 2020 for extensive discussion). However, FEP theorists seem to think it is (e.g. Friston 2013: 2;
Kirchhoff  and  Kiverstein  2019b:  2).  Since  here  I’m  reporting  the  standard  presentation  of  the  FEP,  and
throughout the essay I’m interested only in how MBs, as the FEP conceives of them, are used in the debate over
vehicle externalism, I concede the point.
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environmental surroundings. In the parlance of the FEP, the MB induces a separation between
internal  states (the innards of the cell) and the  external  states (the environment the cell is
embedded in). Internal and external states are separated by MBs in the sense that MBs make
internal  states  conditionally  independent over external states.  Notice,  importantly,  that  the
insulation is  exclusively statistical, and never causal. In fact, insofar MBs enable perceptual
and active inference, they enable internal and external states to be causally coupled (Friston
2013).  This  is  due  to  the  internal  partitions  of  MBs,  and  how  these  partitions  interact.
According to the FEP, each MB is partitioned into two disjoint sets of states, termed sensory
and active states. The partition is roughly as follows: a state of a MB is a sensory state if it is
influenced by external states and influences internal (and active) states. Conversely, the state
is an active state  if it is influenced by internal states, and influences external (and sensory)
states. Notice that active and sensory states also influence each other, in a way that closely
resembles perception-action loops (Fabry 2017). In this way, MBs allow an agent to couple
sensomotorically with the environment.
The interplay of internal and external states through active and sensory states allows to
formalize the notions of perceptual and active inference in terms of MBs and their states (e.g.
Ramstead  et  al. 2018,  figure  1).  Recall,  in  perceptual  inference,  a  biological  system
minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between its “best guesses” and the actual states of
the  world.  Conversely,  through  active  inference,  a  system  minimizes  surprisal  directly,
inducing a self-generated, and selective, change in the sensory states it samples.
In perceptual inference, a system attunes its “best guess” (i.e. the variational/recognition
density) encoded in its internal states to the environmental contingencies (i.e. external states)
given the sensory states of its MB. But, given the interplay of internal and active states, these
changes will, at least sometimes, change active states, which, in turn, change external and
sensory states. Hence, changes in internal states lead to the selective resampling of sensory
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states and, more broadly, a change of external states so as to make  them fit the organism's
internal states, which is active inference. Thus, perceptual and active inference are naturally
captured, and formalized, by MBs. In general, one can think of the coupling between internal
and external  states  (that  is,  to  perceptual  and active  inference)  as  the  synchronization  of
internal and external states (Friston 2013; Bruineberg et al. 2018: 2433-2440).
One  last  step.  Self-organizing  systems  must  avoid  surprisal,  which  is  the  (negative
logarithm of) the probability of sensory states. The closer a sensory state is in the state-space,
to the states making up the system’s phenotype, the lower its surprisal. But surprisal is also
the complement of Bayesian model evidence (Friston 2019: 177). This means that organisms
(i.e. internal states) can be seen as a statistical models11 of the environment which interact
with their surrounding so as to acquire evidence for their correctness, thereby prolonging their
existence. This is why, on the view the FEP proposes, biological self-organization is cast as a
process of self-evidencing (Friston 2013; Hohwy 2016). 
More could be said about the FEP and its explanatory ambitions. But, since here my target
is the role MBs play in the debate over vehicle externalism, I believe this simple sketch is
sufficient for present purposes. So, how does all this bear on the truth of vehicle externalism?
3 - Markov Blankets do not adjudicate the vehicle internalism/externalism debate
According to  the FEP,  MBs are  ontologically  real  boundaries  enabling  perception  and
action. Given that perception and action intuitively are the interfaces separating the thinking
machinery from the environment, it is tempting to resort to MBs to determine whether the
11 The interpretation of “models” in this context is far from straightforward. A prominent reading applies to a
very thin, but still ontologically committed, notion of model, according to which organisms literally are models
of the organism-niche coupled system just in the sense that  they actively regulate their encounters  with the
environment (Conant and Ashby 1970). Others have suggested an instrumental reading of models instead (van
Es 2020;  Baltieri  et  al.  2020).  Given  the  purpose of  this  essay,  however,  I  can stay neutral  on the matter
(thankfully). 
PRE PEER REVIEW VERSION       9/29
thinking machinery includes environmental or bodily constituents, thereby determining the
truth of vehicle externalism.
Yet it seems that doing so immediately begs the question against vehicle externalism. This
is because, according to the summary of the FEP presented above, MBs are the boundaries of
organisms. Vehicle externalism, however:
“[...]  is  a  view according  to  which  thinking  and cognizing  may  (at  times)
depend directly and noninstrumentally upon the work of the body and/or the
extraorganismic environment.” (Clark 2008: XXVIII; emphasis added)
Vehicle  externalism claims that  constituents  of the thinking machinery can be located on
either  side of  the  boundary  separating  the  biological  agent  from  the  environment.  But,
according to the official presentation of the FEP given above, that boundary just is the MB.
So it seems that assuming, without any further argument, that MBs demarcate the thinking
machinery simply begs the question against vehicle externalism.
Perhaps  such  an  assumption  can  be  justified  by  some  argument  A showing  that  the
boundary of the organism is the relevant boundary of the thinking machinery. This is surely
possible. Yet, in such a case, it would be  A, rather than any theoretical appeal to MBs, to
adjudicate the debate over vehicle externalism (in favor of the internalist). This is because A
would show that the thinking machinery is entirely contained within the organism, thereby
proving that vehicle externalism is false, leaving no role to MBs in adjudicating its truth.
The FEP theorist  is  now likely  to  point  out  I  misrepresented  MBs,  because  MBs are
multiple and nested (Kirchhoff et al. 2018; Hesp et al. 2019). Cells, each with its own MB,
sometimes join forces, constituting multicellular systems that are free-energy minimizers  in
their own right, and thus possess a MB. And in fact, a FEP theorist would claim that we find
MBs at every scale of organization, from cells, to tissues and organs (Friston  et al. 2015;
Palacios  et al. 2020), organisms (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a), agent in their ecological
niches (Bruineberg  et al.  2018b), and eventually the entire  biosphere (Rubin  et al.  2020).
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Therefore, MBs do not  necessarily coincide with the boundaries of an organism, and thus
provide a principled way to identify systems as they are in nature. They can thus be used to
identify specific systems, such as our thinking machinery, and determine whether it “extends”
(e.g. Hohwy 2016; Ramstead et al. 2019; Sims 2020).
The core idea is simple: first, one finds the relevant MB. Then, one looks at what makes up
the  internal  states.  If  the internal  states  encompass  only neural  components,  then  vehicle
externalism is false. Otherwise, vehicle externalism is true. This seems the approach Hohwy
(2016) adopted:
“[...]  there  is  a  quite  specific  account  of  what  happens  in  active  inference,
which puts part of the boundary at the dorsal horn of the spinal cord. [...] This
tells us how neurocentric we should be: the mind begins where sensory input is
delivered through exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive receptors and
it  ends where proprioceptive predictions  are  delivered,  mainly in the spinal
cord.” (Hohwy 2016: 277; emphasis added)
The idea of using MBs in this way is attractive for a number of reasons. As said above, MBs
are taken to be principled boundaries. In fact, MBs are “achieved by a system through active
inference” (Ramstead et al. 2019: 11) and “result from a system’s dynamics” (Ramstead et al.
2018:3).  For  this  reason,  they  seem to  provide  a  non-arbitrary way to  identify  systems.
Moreover, the identification of MBs is an empirical matter, which hinges upon the empirical
identification of patterns of statistical independence. In Howhy’s quote above, for instance,
the relevant account of what happens in active inference is the empirical account provided by
(Friston et al. 2010). Thus, MBs seem to promise a principled and empirically sound solution
to the debate over vehicle externalism, providing what many philosophers engaged in that
debate have strived to provide (e.g. Kaplan 2012). Moreover, MBs appear able to deliver the
desired good circumventing the host of thorny philosophical issues that often have halted the
debate over extended cognition,  such as issues concerning non-derived content (Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein 2019a: 70-71; see Piredda 2017 for a nice summary). Yet, it seems to me that
this usage of MBs raises at least three distinct problems.
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First, the “multiple and nested” view of MBs smuggles a different conception of MBs into
the debate. For now MBs are not (or not only) the boundaries of organisms, but rather the
boundaries of biological systems in general, if not of systems in general (e.g. Hipolito 2019;
Friston 2019; Friston et al. 2020). Perhaps this is the correct conception of MBs, but if it is, it
does not immediately follow from the official presentation of the FEP provided above. Indeed
it  seems  hard  to  square  the  claim  that  the  FEP  is  a  principled  account  of  biological
organization with the claim that MBs demarcate systems in general. Surely not every system
is a biological system.
Secondly, it is not clear whether allowing such a proliferation of MBs would enable them
to play a role in determining the truth of vehicle externalism. This is because, if MBs are
multiple and nested within each other, we would need a criterion C to determine which MB,
in this fractal sea of MBs, bounds the (perhaps extended) thinking machinery. However, in
such a  case,  the  truth  of  vehicle  externalism would  be  determined  by C,  rather  than  the
theoretical construct of a MB.12
Lastly, and I believe most importantly, there are reasons to deny that MBs can be used to
identify systems (thinking machinery included). This is because the identification of a system
is logically prior to the identification of a system’s MB. Hence, in order to identify the MB of
the thinking machinery,  we must already have determined what the thinking machinery is.
But if we already have determined what the thinking machinery is, then we  already know
whether vehicle externalism is true or not: if the thinking machinery coincides with the brain,
then vehicle  externalism is  false,  otherwise it  is true.  As a result,  we cannot  use MBs to
determine whether vehicle externalism is true, on the pain of circularity.
To see why this is the case, consider how MBs are defined in the relevant literature on
graphical models. Here’s a canonical13 definition:
12 Andy Clark (2017a: 8) made a similar remark, but I think it is important to state the point explicitly.
13 I’m not reporting Pearl’s (1988: 97) original definition only for brevity. This is because Pearl defines MBs in
terms of further technical concepts (namely, independency maps) which require explanation in their own right. 
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“Definition 2.20 (Markov Blanket) The Markov blanket of a variable X is the
set consisting of the parents of X, the children of X and the variables sharing a
child with X. ” (Koski and Noble 2009: 50)
Notice that MBs are defined in terms of the target (blanketed) variable. The definition might
be  “expanded”  so  as  to  cover  more  than  a  variable,  thereby  capturing  all  the  variables
implicated in a description of a given system of interest. But still, given this definition, one
first identifies a variable (or set of variables) of interest, and then identifies the relevant MB
of that variable (or set of variables). There is thus no absolute notion of MB, and I cannot just
point to a graph and ask: “Ok, now tell me where is the relevant Markov Blanket”. To ask so,
I  must  already  have  identified  a  node,  whose  MB  I’m  interested  in.  The  direction  of
identification runs from variables to MBs, and not the other way around.
The technical literature on the FEP confirms this. For instance, Ramstead et al. (2019: 25)
argue that we can choose the relevant MB, depending on our explanatory interests.14 But this
clearly entails that, in order to choose a relevant MB, we must  already  have identified the
system of interest; that is, the system whose behavior we wish to explain. And if the system of
interest is the thinking machinery, it follows we must already have identified it. But if this is
the case, then we  already know whether it  “extends” or not. Similarly,  Allen and Friston
(2018: 2466) and Clark (2017a) inform us that what counts as the relevant MB depends on
our explanatory interests. Even  Hohwy (2016)15 is forced to admit that the choice of what
counts  as  the  relevant  MB  is  at  least  partially  pragmatic,  and  that  it  depends  on  our
explanatory goals.16
14 A claim that hardly squares with other claims made by Ramstead and colleagues; such as the claim that MBs
are “ontological” (see Ramstead et al. 2019: 3) and that MBs are “produced” by a system’s behavior.
15 Albeit, in all fairness to Hohwy, he does hold that the MB around the brain is  in principle privileged, and
thus it is the one identifying the thinking machinery proper. I will discuss this point below (see section 4)
16 Importantly,  the  mere  fact  that,  given  our  explanatory  interests,  we  can  “place”  MBs  around  putative
“extended” thinking machineries  provides  no vindication  of  vehicle  externalism.  For  vehicle  internalists  do
acknowledge that explanations of cognitive outputs must take into account environmental factors (Rupert 2009;
Sterenly 2010). So, if MBs are identified depending on our explanatory interests,  both vehicle externalists and
internalists can identify “extended” MBs. They would nevertheless disagree on whether these MBs identify all
and only the constituent parts of the thinking machinery.
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This  is  of  course a  small  sample,  but  it  could be enlarged.  However,  the point  seems
reasonably  clear:  first,  one  “picks  up”  a  system  of  interest,  and  then one  identifies  the
system’s MB. Thus, if the system of interest is the thinking machinery, one must already have
identified it to find its MB. But if that machinery has already been identified, then we already
know whether vehicle externalism is correct. Hence, MBs  cannot  (logically) adjudicate the
debate over vehicle externalism, on the pain of circularity.
4 - Markov Blankets are not good framing devices to discuss vehicle externalism
At this  juncture,  it  is  easy  to  imagine  the  FEP theorist  insisting  that  MBs  do have a
relevance  for the debate  on vehicle  externalism,  as they provide a “formal  ontology”17:  a
formal framework enabling us to provide a crisp answer to hard philosophical questions, like
“is vehicle externalism true?” (cfr. Constant et al. 2019; Ramstead et al. 2019; 2020b). Here’s
a clear statement of the idea, applied to the debate over vehicle externalism:
“The  Markov  Blanket  formalism  as  applied  to  systems  that  approximate
Bayesian  inference  serves  as  an  attractive  statistical  framework  for
demarcating  the  boundaries  of  the  mind.  Unlike  other  rival  candidates  for
“marks  of  the  cognitive”  the  Markov  Blanket  formalism  has  the  virtue  of
avoiding begging the question in the extended  mind debate. [...] The Markov
Blanket  concept  escapes  these problems.” (Kirchhoff  and Kiverstein 2019a:
69-70; emphasis added)
Perhaps this is correct. Maybe asking “which MB, in the fractal sea of MBs, bounds the
thinking  machinery”  yields  more  satisfactory  results  than  trying  to  find  a  “mark  of  the
cognitive” (e.g. Adams and Aizawa 2008).18
17  Notice,  importantly,  that  the relevant  conception of MBs has changed again.  Now MBs are no longer
ontologically real functional boundaries of systems in general, but only posits of a formal framework. 
18  However, there seems to be a general problem with this idea. Consider the relevant variables implicated in a
psychological explanation. Depression, for instance, is correlated with a range of variables such as “job loss” or
“humiliation” (I’m taking this example from Campbell 2007). These variables can be represented in a causal
graph, and thus might end up constituting the MB of one’s thinking machinery. Suppose this happens: in what
sense would “being unemployed” be part of the functional boundary separating one’s thinking machinery from
the environment? I must confess that such a claim strikes me as simply unintelligible. But it also seems a claim
that might be licensed by the present framework. Thanks to ANONYMIZED FOR BLIND REVIEW for having
pointed this out to me.
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Here, I wish to suggest that this is not the case. In fact, I beleive that framing the debate
around vehicle externalism in terms of MBs has thus far19 yielded consequences unpalatable
enough to make the whole MB-based approach to vehicle externalism worth reconsidering.
To see why,  consider  two prominent  MB-based approaches  to  the debate over vehicle
externalism.  One  is  Hohwy’s  (2016;  2017)  defense  of  vehicle  internalism;  the  other  is
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s (2019a; 2019b) defence of vehicle externalism.20
Importantly,  both approaches use MBs to frame the debate over vehicle externalism in
roughly the same way. Both approaches take MBs to be “multiple and nested” (Hohwy 2016:
264; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 73-76). As a consequence, both accounts resort to MBs
to frame the vehicle internalism/externalism debate in terms of which MB should be chosen
as the MB bounding the thinking machinery, and why that specific MB should be preferred
over all the other MBs (e.g. Hohwy 2016: 265; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a: 79-80). Both
accounts agree on the fact that the choice of the relevant MB must be justified using only
theoretical resources internal to the FEP. In a sense, thus, both accounts agree upon the fact
that, if properly interrogated, the FEP will tell us where the mind stops and the rest of the
world begins  (Hohwy 2016:  267-273;  2017: 2-4;  Kirchhoff  and Kiverstein 2019a:  79-81;
2019b: 17-18). Importantly, both accounts agree upon a clear MB-based criterion to identify
the boundaries of the mind; namely, that the relevant MB is the MB that identifies the internal
states that minimize surprisal  over time, or  on average and in the long run. Here’s Hohwy
spelling it out:
19 The “thus far” part is important: I’m open to the possibility that there might be a perspicuous way to use MBs
in the vehicle externalist debate. The FEP theorist is thus challenged to articulate one.
20 The choice of Hohwy’s account as a representative account of the internalist front is somewhat forced by the
fact that other philosophers defending forms of internalism (broadly speaking) about predictive processing/the
FEP do not defend vehicle internalism directly (e.g. Gładziejewski 2017; Wiese 2018). The choice of Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein as representatives of the vehicle externalist front is less forced, but still pretty much obliged:
Clark (2017a; 2017b) is more concerned with predictive processing rather than the FEP. And (Ramstead et al.
2019) seem to believe that the choice of considering “extended” systems depends purely on our explanatory
interests;  a position that  can be squared with an embedded, but still  vehicle internalist,  view (Rupert  2009;
Sterenly 2010).
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“Another, somewhat more principled response [...] is to rank agents according
to  their  overall,  long  term  prediction  error  minimization (or  free-energy
minimization): the agent worthy of explanatory focus is the system that in the
long run is best at revisiting a limited (but not too small) set of states. It is most
plausible  that  such a  minimal  entropy system is  constituted  by the nervous
system of what we normally identify as a biological organism: [...]  extended
agents  do  not  maintain  low entropy  in  the  long  run”  (Hohwy 2016:  265;
emphasis added)
where an “agent” is just a system surrounded by a MB. Here’s Kirchhoff and Kiverstein
making essentially the same point:
“The  self-evidencing  nature  of  biological  agents  blocks  the  threat  from
cognitive bloat. External resources form part of an agent’s mind when they are
poised to play a part in the process of active inference that keeps surprisal at
minimum overtime. [...] More generally we suggest an external resource will
count  as  a  part  of  an  individual’s  mind  if  it  is  a  part  of  a  system whose
existence  is produced  and  maintained through  a  self-evidencing  process”
(Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019b: 17-18)
Recall that such an “in the long run” criterion is intrinsic in the structure of the FEP. The
FEP is an account of how biological systems (if not systems in general) persists  overtime.
According to the FEP, biological systems persist through time by minimizing entropy, that is,
surprisal  on average. And since surprisal is the complement of model evidence, this means
that organisms are self-evidencing systems; that is, systems that, overtime, seek the evidence
confirming their existence, thereby prolonging it.
Lastly,  both  accounts  thake  the  “on  average  and  in  the  long  run”  criterion  to  be
extensionally adequate; that is, apt to single out the MBs enshrouding all and only the cogs of
the thinking machinery.  This  is  because the criterion  is  used to  solve two deeply related
problems concerning the way in which the “boundaries of the mind” are drawn; namely the
“cognitive bloat” objection to vehicle externalism (i.e. too much stuff gets counted as a cog in
the thinking machinery) and the “shrinking brain” objection to vehicle internalism (i.e. too
little stuff gets counted as a cog, see Anderson 2017) at once.
The number of premises shared by the accounts proposed by Kirchhoff, Kiverstein and
Hohwy immediately invites the following question: if the premises are the same, then why do
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the conclusions differ? If they all espouse the same premises21 and the same relevant criterion
to identify the thinking machinery,  their  conclusions  should be the same.  So, apparently,
either Hohwy or Kirchhoff and Kiverstein  mis-applied the criterion.  This, it  seems to me,
suggests that framing the debate over vehicle externalism in terms of MBs does not, in and by
itself, lead us  straight to a solution of the debate. Now, one might object that framing that
debate in terms of MBs does not, in and of itself,  make that  debate easier to solve.  Fair
enough.  But  then,  why  bother  with  the  formal  framework they  provide?  What  sort  of
theoretical boon are MBs providing here?
I am inclined to answer “none”. In fact, I believe that the criterion Hohwy, Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein derive from the FEP is grossly extensionally inadequate. Recall that, during active
inference,  an agent “brings about” the sensory states it  expects to encounter.  Importantly,
these  states  encompasse  all the  variables  that  define  the  state-space  in  which  the  agent
phenotype is embedded. For us humans (an, broadly speaking, animals) this includes extero-,
intero- and viscero-ceptive states (e.g. Seth and Friston 2016). Hence, we (and animals in
general) must minimize free-energy in respect to all these states.
Consider now the following, often used, example (e.g. Bruineberg 2018: 3; Bruineberg et
al. 2018a: 2423; Ramstead et al. 2019: 9, Veissière  et al. 2020): human beings expect their
bodily temperature to be around 36.6°. For a human, having a bodily temperature around
36.6° is the least surprisaling state; and deviations from that state, whether they increase or
decrease the bodily temperature, increase surprisal. So, when our bodily temperature deviates
from the predicted 36.6°, we engage in active inference to avoid dangerous surprisaling states.
We do so, for instance, by sweating, so as to lower our bodily temperature when it is too high.
21 One might object that Kirchhoff, Kiverstein and Hohwy do not really  espouse the same premises, as their
theoretical  commitments  differ  widely.  For  instance,  whereas  Hohwy  holds  that  the  FEP  yields  a
representationalist  and  inferentialist  account  of  cognition  (e.g.  Kiefer  and  Hohwy  2019),  Kirchhoff  and
Kiverstein argue that the FEP leans towards a radical form of enactivism (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a). This
is surely correct. However, it is not clear how these different theoretical commitments bear onto the question at
hand. In fact, vehicle externalism is surely compatible with both representationalism (e.g. Clark 2008) and anti-
representationalism (e.g. Chemero 2009).
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Or by trembling, so as to raise it when it is too low. We also keep our bodily temperature
around 36.6°  by wearing appropriate clothes. And clothes appear to be part of the physical
machinery by means of which we minimize free energy, and thus avoid surprisal overtime, on
average and in the long run: we wear clothes more often than not, and we surely wear them
with the purpose of keeping our bodily temperature around 36.6°. It thus seems correct to
conclude that, according to Kirchhoff, Kiverstein and Hohwy’s criterion,  the relevant MB
identifying  the thinking machinery will  include  clothes.  But  this  conclusion surely seems
wrong.22 So,  it  seems correct  to  conclude  that  the proposed criterion  is  not extensionally
adequate: it counts too much stuff as a cog in the thinking machinery.
Secondly, and perhaps more decisively, it seems that when it comes to internal (i.e. neural)
vehicles, we do not judge whether they qualify as parts in the thinking machinery based on
their role in free-energy minimization  on average and in the long run. Hence, that criterion
violates the core insight that the “parity principle” is trying to express; namely, that we should
judge whether candidate external vehicles are part of our thinking machinery with the same
metric we deploy to judge internal vehicles (Clark 2008; 77-78; 2013: 195).23
Consider the following scenario: after a severe head injury, a child gets a part of her brain
x explanted at time t. After the surgery, she recovers and goes on to live a long (and cognitive
unimpaired) life. It seems intuitively correct to say that, after  t, the neural region x does not
count as a cog in her thinking machinery. But it seems equally intuitively correct to say that,
before t, the neural region x actually was a cog in her thinking machinery.24 That is, at time t-
22 Minimally, because the constituents of our thinking machinery are supposed to be information-processors of
some sort, but clothes do not appear to be information processors of any kind. I suspect, however, that even the
most extreme proponents of vehicle externalism would concede me this point without resistance.
23 Vehicle externalists that emphasize the  complementarity of inner and outer resources (e.g. Menary 2007;
2018; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a) find the parity principle problematic, as it might suggest that internal and
external  resources  must  be  functionally  similar.  Importantly,  however,  even  vehicle  externalists  stressing
complementarity agree on the fact  that  whether  a putative vehicle counts as a cog in the mental  machinery
depends  exclusively  on the sort of task it  performs in the relevant sort of processing in which it  takes part,
regardless of its spatial location. Thus, they agree with the parity principle as stated in the main text. This point is
sometimes explicitly acknowledged (Menary 2007: 55-57; Gallagher 2018).
24 There is, to be sure, a call to intuition here. But I think it is fine, as, at the end of the day, determining what
really qualifies as a cog in the mental machinery is based on our intuitions about what counts as cognitive (see
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1 it  seems  intuitively  correct  to  judge  x a  cog  in  the  thinking  machinery.  And,  more
importantly, it seems unlikely that, at t-1, we would revise such a verdict, were we to discover
that, due to an historical accident, x will not partake in free-energy minimization on average
and in the long run (by stipulation, since “the owner” of x is a child, she spends most of her
life without x). In other words, it seems correct to say that, when x is appropriately wired, it
just is a cog in the thinking machinery, regardless of what its future career as a piece of a free-
energy minimizing engine will be. The fact that a putative piece (neural or non-neural) of the
thinking machinery can be contingently decoupled from the rest of that machinery by some
future event “does not rule out cognitive status”, as Clark and Chalmers (1998: 11) wrote.
Notice further that, albeit in less extreme form, many purely neural “candidate cogs” of our
thinking machinery do not end up performing free-energy minimization on average and in the
long run.  Consider,  for instance,  synaptic  pruning. According to the FEP, such a  process
should  be  understood  in  terms  of  a  reduction  in  model  parameters,  bolstering  neuronal
efficiency (Friston 2010: 131). But such a description of synaptic pruning makes sense only if
we concede that the “pruned” synapses  were parameters of the model  seeking evidence for
itself.  Yet,  synaptic  pruning is  a  process that  naturally  happens during development  (e.g.
Changeaux 1985), when one is still a child. Hence it seems that we are committed to the claim
that the relevant model (i.e. the internal states enshrouded by a MB) has genuine constituents
which  are  not  there  in  the  long  run,  and  thus  cannot  contribute  to  long-term  error
minimization.  Moreover,  a  neuronal  region  might  fail  to  perform  its  own  free-energy
minimization duties in the long run without having to “leave the brain”,  for instance as a
result of a disconnection syndrome (see Parr and Friston 2020). Yet, it seems correct to say
that such a neural region is still a cog in the thinking machinery - indeed, it is only because
such  a  cog  is  damaged  that  we  can  account  for  the  symptoms  brought  about  by  the
disconnection  syndrome.  Lastly,  under  normal  conditions,  neural  regions  organize  in
Clark 2010: 53-54; 2019: 277); at least, until a suitably uncontested “mark of the mental/cognitive” is provided.
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“transient” task specific neuronal devices (see Anderson 2014; Clark 2017b for a “predictive”
take  on  the  issue).  But  it  is  far  from clear  whether  any  such  transiently  created  device
performs free-energy minimization in the long run. Yet it seems intuitively correct to count
them as cogs in the thinking machinery nevertheless.
Now, if all of this is true for neural candidate vehicles and the parity principle is correct25,
then the same must hold for putative external vehicles. Hence, given if we would not apply
the “overtime, on average and in the long run” criterion to pieces of the brain, we should not
apply it to putative external vehicles. And since (at least intuitively) the antecedent is correct,
the consequent follows.
Now, perhaps we could substitute the “overtime, on average and in the long run” criterion
with something better. However, the “overtime, on average and in the long run” criterion is
taken to directly “fall off” out of the FEP. And, if fact, both Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019a:
80-81; 2019b 17-18) and Hohwy (2016: 272) derive it directly by the self-evidencing nature
of living systems, for self-evidencing just is minimizing free-energy overtime, in the long run
(e.g. Friston 2013; Friston et al. 2020). Hence, if this is correct, there seems to be no easy way
to  displace  the  “overtime,  on  average  and  in  the  long  run”  criterion  without thereby
introducing substantial modifications in the theoretical architecture of the FEP itself.
Perhaps the “overtime, on average and in the long run” criterion could be complemented
by some further criterion, ensuring that the relevant thinking machinery is identified in an
extensionally  adequate  and  non  question-begging  way.  The  important  thing  to  notice,  I
believe, is that such a criterion would be in the task of correcting the verdicts yielded by the
“overtime, on average and in the long run” criterion. This heavily suggests that MBs do not
provide  a  good theoretical  framework  for  articulating  the  vehicle  externalism/internalism
25  Of course, one could provide an argument against the parity principle and counter this argument. But such
an  argument  would  effectively  be  a  refutation  of  vehicle  externalism,  and  so  it  would  solve  the  vehicle
externalism debate (in favor of vehicle internalism), leaving MBs no role to play in it.
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debate - in fact, we would need a criterion precisely to correct the shortcomings of such a
framing.
5 - Is vehicle externalism (conditioned over Markov Blankets) possible? 
Thus far,  I  have  argued that  MBs will  not  resolve  the  vehicle  externalism/internalism
debate, and that framing such a debate in terms of MBs has thus far yielded very unwelcome
theoretical consequences. Here, I wish to claim that we cannot meaningfully frame the vehicle
externalism/internalism  debate  in  terms  of  MBs,  for  doing  so  makes  vehicle  internalism
vacuously true, leading to a purely verbal solution of the debate. My argument hinges on two
premises.
The first premise is that the  relevant  meaning of “external(-ism)” and “internal(-ism)” is
defined in terms of MBs, as seen in section 2. Recall: according to the FEP, what counts as
internal and external depends on the presence of some relevant MB. This premise is widely
shared in the FEP literature (e.g. Friston 2013; Wiese 2018: 223-227; Kirchhoff et al. 2018).
Here’s the way in which Hohwy puts it:
“It is tempting to say that any account of perception and cognition that operates
with internal models must in some sense be internalist.  But the natural next
question  is  what  makes  internal  models  internal?  [...]  A  better  answer  is
provided  by  the  notion  of  Markov  Blankets  and  self-evidencing  through
approximation to Bayesian inference. Here is a principled distinction between
the  internal,  known  causes  as  they  are  identified  by  the  model,  and  the
external,  hidden causes on the other  side of  the Markov Blanket.” (Hohwy
2017: 6-7, emphasis added)
It seems to me there isn’t much more to say: the meaning of “internal(-ism)” and “external(-
ism)” is fixated by the relevant MB (see also Ramstead et al. 2019).
The second premise is that we should identify the thinking machinery by means of MBs.
Again, this is a premise widely shared in the literature over “predictive” vehicle externalism. I
think the references given in the previous sections substantiate this claim enough.
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But then, if the thinking machinery is enshrouded by an MB, and if what is enshrouded by
an MB is by definition  internal in the relevant sense, then all the vehicles of the thinking
machinery are by definition internal, vehicle internalism is by definition true, and everyone
engaged in the debate over predictive vehicle externalism is by definition a vehicle internalist.
In the continuation of the passage cited above  Jackob Hohwy almost noticed the issue:
“This seems a clear way to define internalism as a view of the mind according
to which perceptual  and cognitive processing all  happen within the internal
model,  or, equivalently,  within the Markov Blanket.  This is then what non-
internalist  views  must  deny.  [...] Notice  that  this  definition  of  internalism
makes Clark an internalist” (Hohwy 2017: 6-7, emphasis added)
But if this is the case, then we should reject the proposed definition of “internal(ism)” and
“external(ism)”. We wish that our relevant definitions capture at least paradigmatic instances
of the thing being defined. Hence, our relevant definition of “(vehicle) externalism” should
capture at least paradigmatic instances of vehicle externalism; and the works of Andy Clark
surely are one such instance. Hence, it seems correct to conclude that if MBs provide us with
a partition between internal and external, then that partition is not  the relevant partition at
issue in the debate over vehicle externalism.
My argument  has two premises.  A good way to resist  it  is  to deny one of them.  Can
premise one be denied? Well, the first premise is just that “internal” and “external” should be
defined in reference to MBs. We can surely deny this, but this invites the question: if MBs do
not  decide what  counts  as  internal  or external,  then why are they relevant  to  the vehicle
externalism debate? Moreover, denying that MBs define what counts as internal and external
seems in stark contrast with the FEP. So, I do not think the FEP theorist  is free to deny
premise one.
Does the denial of premise two lead to a better outcome? Well, since premise two is the
claim that the thinking machinery should be identified by means of MBs, denying it seems
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just  to  give  up on  MBs,  at  least  when it  comes  to  draw the  boundaries  of  the  thinking
machinery.
Perhaps it could be argued that premise one and premise two are fine, and that vehicle
internalists have won the debate via MBs. As far as I can see this is a technically viable move,
but not an  attractive one; not even for vehicle internalists. In fact, accepting both premises
makes  vehicle  externalism impossible.  But  everyone  engaged  in  the  debate  over  vehicle
externalism claims that it is possible, vehicle internalists included (e.g. Adams and Aizawa
2008:  25-28).  So,  it  seems  that  if  vehicle  internalists  accept  that  vehicle  externalism  is
possible (as they do), then they cannot accept a MB-based definition of “internal(-ism)” and
“external(-ism)”, on the pain of contradiction.
Vehicle  internalists  might  however  be  tempted  to  accept  the  MB-based  definition  of
“internal(-ism)” and “external(-ism)” and deny that vehicle externalism is possible. But doing
so looks like changing the topic of the conversation. For the relevant debate concerns whether
or not vehicle externalism is true in the actual world. Of course, it is possible to claim that
something is not true in the actual world by claiming it is not true in all possible worlds. But
such a claim needs to be justified,  and the worries raised in the previous section suggest
calling upon MBs to determine the truth of vehicle externalism is not a well-justified move.
Moreover, I doubt such a redefinition of “internalism” would buy the internalist something
more than a purely  verbal  victory.  For, were “internalism” to be redefined in such a way,
there  would still  be a  clash among internalists  who believe that  internal  states are  purely
neural and internalists who believe that, at least sometimes, the internal states are not purely
neural. It thus seems that accepting both premises does make vehicle internalism vacuously
true.  For,  it  seems  that,  thus  secured,  the  truth  of  vehicle  internalism  has  no  relevant
consequence - apart from forcing us to refer to vehicle externalism as “vehicle internalism”,
in a confusing way.
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I  thus  recommend  to  abandon  at  least one  of  the  two  premises  above.  Given  that
abandoning premise one runs counter  to the FEP, I  believe  the FEP theorist  is  better  off
giving up premise two; that is, I believe the FEP theorist should acknowledge that MBs do not
matter in the debate over vehicle externalism.
6 - Concluding remarks
I have argued that MBs are not relevant  to the debate over vehicle externalism.  If the
arguments I’ve provided here are on the right track, MBs do not solve, nor help to solve, the
debate surrounding “the extended mind”.
Importantly,  I do not take my arguments to be “knockdown” arguments. I’m willing to
concede that there might be some yet-to-be-discovered way to fruitfully apply MBs in the
debate over vehicle externalism. So perhaps what I’m really doing here is challenging FEP
enthusiasts to show us that there is such an application.
I would like to conclude by noticing that the challenge here raised might be deeper than
my arguments show. Up to this point, I’ve been neutral on the metaphysical status of MBs,
accepting (for the sake of discussion) that MBs really are as the FEP theorist thinks of them.
Importantly, however, it is far from clear that the FEP theorist conceives MBs in only one
way, as sometimes noticed in the essay. More generally, the metaphysical status of MBs is far
from clear in the literature over the FEP. As extensively argued in (Bruineberg  et al. 2020;
Menary and Gillet  2020),  MBs are,  strictly  speaking,  only formal  properties  of  nodes  in
graphical  models;  and it  is not  immediately clear whether they also denote the functional
boundaries  of biological  agents,  or systems in general.  It  thus seems to me that  the FEP
theorist  faces a double challenge.  First,  the FEP theorist must determine the metaphysical
status of MBs. Secondly, the FEP theorist must show that MBs are a viable tool to determine
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where the thinking machinery stops and the rest of the world begins. Time will tell how (and
whether) these challenges will be met.
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